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Abstract
This paper considers the design of optimal unemployment insur-
ance with multiple types of job. The environment is an extension
of Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. We study the model by using the
rst-order approach. The optimal contract still displays benets de-
creasing over the length of the unemployment spell. The wage tax
after reemployment depends on the length of unemployment spell.
1 Introduction
A one-spell unemployment insurance (hereafter UI) model is a type of UI
model in which employment is an absorbing state. This paper extends the
one-spell UI model of Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] by incorporating multiple
types of job into the model. The signicant extension is when search e¤ort
a¤ects not only the probability of receiving an o¤er but also the kind of o¤er
a low wage o¤er or a high wage o¤er. It is shown that wage tax dependent
on history, and benets that decrease over the duration of unemployment
spell are robust in this extension. With multiple types of job, the extra
contingency on o¤er type is not redundant. It is shown that whether the
wage taxes are di¤erent across di¤erent types of job depends on the e¤ect of
search e¤ort on o¤er type. For the sake of simplicity, this paper uses the rst-
order approach (hereafter FOA). The analysis concerning validity of FOA in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] applies only to their model. We give a di¤erent
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analysis for the signicant extension based on Rogerson (1985). However,
there are two gaps in my analysis. These gaps are also present in Hopenhayn
and Nicolini [4].
The rst gap concerns FOA. Our argument about validity of FOA uses
the rst-order derivatives of the planners cost function. Showing di¤eren-
tiability of this cost function is not yet accomplished, because the objec-
tive function in the recursive problem is not convex so that the standard
Benveniste-Scheinkman technique is not applied.
The second gap involves the positive aspect of the contract. Convexity of
the cost function is used as a su¢ cient condition for decreasing benets and
history dependence of the wage tax. However, showing the convexity of cost
function is missing because the objective function and the constraint corre-
spondence are not convex in the recursive problem. Hopenhayn and Nicolini
[4] suggested but did not try introducing lotteries to generate convexity.
The next section introduces the extended model. Subsection 3.1 presents
analysis about the FOA. Subsection 3.2 is about decreasing benets and his-
tory dependence. The appendix gives a detailed discussion of the propositions
in Section 3.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and is indexed by t 2 f0; 1; 2:::g. There are two player:
a worker and a planner. The worker can be employed or unemployed. An
employed worker has either a good job or a bad job. At the beginning of
period 0, the worker is unemployed. The unemployed worker has 0 income
and chooses search e¤ort. The search outcome i can be good-job employment
G, bad-job employmentB or unemployment U . We denote byH  fG;B;Ug
the set of all search outcomes. The distribution of outcomes depends on the
workers unobservable search e¤ort. The more e¤ort a worker exerts, the
more likely is the better outcome. Let m(i; a) be the probability of outcome
i when search e¤ort a is taken, where a 2 E  [0; a]. m(i; a) satises
ma(U ; a) < 0, ma(U ; a) + ma(B; a) < 0 and ma(U ; 0) =  1. It displays
diminishing returns to scale, i.e., maa(U ; a) > 0 and maa(U ; a)+maa(B; a) >
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01.
If the worker is employed, i.e., i 2 fG;Bg, she earns wage wi. The good
job pays higher wage, that is, wG > wB. She can pursue on-the-job search.
To simplify the situation, we assume wB  wG so that the planner wants
the employed workers to stop searching for a better job2, where  is the
workers discount factor.
The worker is innitely lived. She draws utility from consumption and
receives disutility from searching. The utility is additively separable between
consumption and e¤ort:
U(c; a) = u(c)  a
with c 2 Z  [0; wG]. Function u satises u(0) = 0, u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0.
Inada conditions hold: u0(0) = +1, u0(wG) = 0.
The risk neutral planner observes the workers status i, but she cannot
observe the workers e¤ort a. She faces a constant interest rate r = 1

 1 > 0.
The worker does not have direct access to asset markets. All borrowing and
saving must be done through the planner. The planner o¤ers the worker an
incentive compatible insurance contract, which species net transfer to the
worker each period. Bilateral commitment is assumed.
2.2 Planners problem
For the sake of parsimonious notations, we will take it for granted that the
employments are absorbing states3. We will focus on the history where the
worker is unemployed for simplicity. We call the worker unemployed in a
period if she is unemployed at the beginning of that period. Let n 2 N =
f0; 1; 2:::g be the public history of staying unemployed for n periods and
remaining unemployed in period n4. All contracts can only be written based
on publicly observed history. The workers deviation, on the other hand,
can depend on her private history5. The contract (a; cG; cB; cU) species
four functions: recommended e¤ort a : N ! E; end-of-period unemployed
1Examples for two information structures include m(U ; a) = h(a);m(U ; a)+m(B; a) =
g(a) and m(U ; a) = h(a);m(B; a) = h(a)g respectively. Suppose that h(a) and g(a) are
convex decreasing function with image in [0; 1].
2See appendix.
3These are shown in Proposition 1 of the appendix.
4n is used both for history and a natural number to save notations.
5The public equilibrium solution concept prevails in this literature.
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consumption cU : N ! [0; wG], constant future period consumption of end-
of-period state-i ci : N ! [0; wG], i 2 fG;Bg.
A contract is incentive compatible if the worker is willing to choose the
recommended e¤ort in each period. The planners objective is to choose an
incentive compatible contract which gives the worker at least his promised
utility and minimizes the cost.
2.3 A Recursive formulation
The planners problem is a repeated moral hazard problem. It is hard be-
cause it has innite amount of constraints and they are history dependence.
Following Spear and Srivastava [10], we introduce promised utility v as an-
other state variable6. The variation of the continuation value of the promised
utility overtime encodes the history dependence. Hence the problem can be
formulated recursively. Let vU be the continuation value of promised utility
when tomorrows state is U , where vU 2 V = [0; V ]7, with V  = u(wG)1  .
A recursive contract (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) species current recommended e¤ort
a, constant consumption in each future period in absorbing state-i ci, with
i 2 fG;Bg, current consumption cU and continuation value vU for remaining
unemployed.
Let U(a; c; vU) denote the promised utility delivered by a recursive con-
tract (a; c; vU), where c is the shorthand for (cG; cB; cU).
U(a; c; vU)  m(G; a)(u(cG)
1   ) +m(B; a)(
u(cB)
1   ) (2.1)
+m(U ; a)(u(cU) + vU)  a
A recursive contract (a; c; vU) is incentive compatible, if search e¤ort a satises
the following constraint IC,
a 2 argmax
a2E
U(a; c; v) (2.2)
6This is the only state variable we need to keep tract of, since employments are two
absorbing states. But we will keep tract of the labor market status in the appendix to
show that employments are absorbing states.
7Among incentive-compatible continuation contracts, that with 0 consumption and 0
e¤ort level every period gives 0 lifetime utility to the worker, while the one with wG
consumption and 0 e¤ort level every period gives V .
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Let (v) be the set of all incentive compatible recursive contracts deliv-
ering promised utility v:
(v)  f(a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 E  Z3  V ja 2 argmax
a2E
U(a; c; vU)
and v  U(a; c; vU);with c = (cG; cB; cU)g.
Let C(V ) be the planners expected cost associated with the optimal con-
tract in (V ). The recursive problem is:
C(V ) = min
(a;cG;cB ;cU ;vU )
m(G; a)(
cG   wG
1   ) (2.3)
+m(B; a)(
cB   wB
1   ) +m(U ; a)(cU + C
(vU))
s.t. (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 (V )
The recursive problem is still di¢ cult because the constraint IC has innite
amount of inequality constraints. If U(a; c; v) is concave in a, we can replace
constraint IC by Ua(a; c; v) = 0 to obtain a problem with only two inequality
constraints, i.e., FOA is valid. But it is not trivial to nd out conditions
under which U(a; c; v) is concave in a.
For
P
i2fG;B;Ugm(i; a) = 1, at least one of m(i; a)s is not strictly concave
in a8. Therefore the workers utility function U(a; c; v) is not always strictly
concave in a9. There exist assumptions under which U(a; c; v) is concave in a
under all (c; v). But these assumptions rule out the environment of economic
interest10.
8Suppose all m(i; a)s are strictly concave in a. Therefore 1   m(G; a)   m(B; a) =
m(U; a) is strictly convex in a. Howeverm(U; a) is concave in a, generating a contradiction.
9Suppose, without loss of generality, that m(G; a) is not strictly concave in a. It is not
hard to see under scheme (wG; 0; 0; 0), U(a; c; v) = m(G; a)u(wG) is not strictly concave
in a.
10To make sure concave U(a; c; v) in a for all (c; v), we need to assume that allm(i; a)s are
concave in a. With
P
i2H m(i; a) = 1, we have
P
i2H ma(i; a) = 0 and
P
i2H maa(i; a) = 0.
Furthermore maa(i; a)  0 for i 2 H implies maa(i; a) = 0. This leads to ma(i; a) = ki
where ki is a constant. Therefore concave U(a; c; v) in a under any (c; v) is equivalent
to m(i; a) = kia + li for all i 2 fG;B;Ug, where ki and li are constants. That is, the
marginal e¤ects of e¤ort a on both probability function and disutility function are xed.
m(i; a) doesnt display diminishing returns to scale. Or disutility from searching cannot
be expressed as a strictly convex function v(a) through changing units of measurement.
These environments are not standard.
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To nd out better assumptions, we consider the following transformation
from (2.1).
U(a; c; v) = m(G; a)(
u(cG)  u(cB)
1   ) + (2.4)
[m(G; a) +m(B; a)](
u(cB)
1     (u(cU) + vU))
+(u(cU) + vU)  a
If a scheme (c; vU) has the ordering
u(cG)
1   u(cB)1   (u(cU) + vU), U(a; c; v)
is also concave in a by (2.4) because m(G; a) and [m(G; a) + m(B; a)] are
concave in a. The main goal in section 3.1 is to nd out conditions under
which the optimal recursive scheme has such ordering.
3 Analysis
The signicant case is when search e¤ort a¤ects not only the probability
of receiving an o¤er but also the kind of o¤er. Accordingly the situation
is divided into two structures: structure 1 where e¤ort doesnt a¤ect o¤er
distribution and structure 2 where e¤ort a¤ects o¤er distribution. This paper
uses FOA which replaces constraint IC by Ua(a; c; vU) = 0 and Ua(a; c; vU) 
0 in the structure 1 and the structure 2, respectively.
3.0.1 Some Notations
Notations are dened in the structure 2 rst. Call the following constraint
IC of FOA:
1  ma(G; a)(u(cG)
1   ) +ma(B; a)(
u(cB)
1   ) (3.1)
+ma(U ; a)(u(cU) + vU)
Let  FOA(V ) be the set of all recursive contracts satisfying (3.1) and deliv-
ering promised utility V :
 FOA(V )  f(a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 E  Z3  V jUa(a; c; vU)  0
and V  U(a; c; vU); with c = (cG; cB; cU)g.
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Note that  FOA(V ) = ;. Also, (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) and (0; wG; wG; wG; V ) are
the only incentive compatible contracts with promised utilities 0 and V ,
respectively. But they are not in  FOA(0) and  FOA(V ). We redene  FOA:
FOA(V ) 
8<:
 FOA(0) [ f(0; 0; 0; 0; 0)g
 FOA(V )
f(0; wG; wG; wG; V )g
if V = 0
if V 2 (0; V ).
if V = V 
(3.2)
Dene mappings T and TFOA in the space of bounded continuous func-
tions, C([0; V ]):
TC(V ) = min
(a;cG;cB ;cU ;vU )
m(G; a)(
cG   wG
1   ) +m(B; a)(
cB   wB
1   ) (3.3)
+m(U ; a)(cU + C(vU))
s.t. (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 (V )
and
TFOAC(V ) = min
(a;cG;cB ;cU ;vU )
m(G; a)(
cG   wG
1   ) +m(B; a)(
cB   wB
1   ) (3.4)
+m(U ; a)(cU + C(vU))
s.t. (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 FOA(V ).
In the structure 1, we use the equality constraint IC of FOA, Ua(a; c; vU) =
0. FOA,  FOA and TFOA are redened accordingly. The standard existence
result of Chapter 9.2 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott applies to mappings T
and TFOA11 in both structures.
3.0.2 First-order conditions
Let CFOA(:) be the xed point of TFOA. The following are rst-order condi-
tions:
11For more discussion of the cost function, see appendix 6.3.
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F.O.C. for ci and vU
1
u0(cG)
=    ma(G; a)
m(G; a)
(3.5)
1
u0(cB)
=    ma(B; a)
m(B; a)
(3.6)
1
u0(cU)
=    ma(U ; a)
m(U ; a)
(3.7)
= CFOAv (vU) (3.8)
F.O.C. for a
0 = ma(G; a)(
cG   wG
1   ) +ma(B; a)(
cB   wB
1   ) (3.9)
+ma(U ; a)(cU + C
FOA(vU)) + Uaa(a; c; vU)
+Ua(a; c; vU)
Envelope condition
(TFOAC
FOA)0(V ) =   (3.10)
Martingale property
(TFOAC
FOA)0(V ) = +m(G; a)
1
u0(cGt)
(3.11)
+m(B; a)
1
u0(cBt)
+m(U ; a)
1
u0(cUt)
cij is state-i workers consumption at period j.
The solution to the problem (TFOACFOA)(V ) satises the above rst-
order conditions12. It also satises Ua(a; c; vU)  0 or Ua(a; c; vU) = 0. In the
next subsection, we want to make sure that constraint IC is also satised.
3.1 First-Order Approach
The constraint IC is equivalent to
U(a; c; v)  U(a0; c; v) for all a0 2 E.
12Interior solution is assumed here. Appendix shows that problem TFOACFOA(V ) has
interior solutions for V 2 (0; V ) under certain conditions.
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which involves a continuum number of inequality constraints. The FOA
reduces the number of inequalities constraints by replacing constraint IC
with workers rst order condition.
Another way to reduce the number of constraints is to reduce the number
of possible e¤ort levels in E. However, such simplication is not proper for
this model. A 2-e¤ort-level spaceE could be interpreted as either searching or
not searching, or searching for a good job or a bad job. It doesnt include both
interpretations. Adding one more e¤ort level leads to a better interpretation,
which however complicates the problem signicantly.
Because of this, we choose to use the FOA. Propositions 3 concerns the
validity of FOA in our model. We assume without proof that the di¤erentia-
bility is preserved by TFOA. The proof is sketched. For a detailed discussion,
please refer to the appendix.
Assumption 1 ma(U;a)
m(U;a)
< ma(B;a)
m(B;a)
 ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
(MLRP)
Assumption 2 1
u0 is concave.
Assumption 3 u 10 is convex13.
Assumption 4 wB

 wB+Pr(G)(wG wB), where Pr(G) = maxa2Em(G; a)
Proposition 3 In both structures, suppose that assumptions 1-414 hold and
that mapping TFOA preserves di¤erentiability at interior promised val-
ues. Then the FOA is valid. The optimal contract implies cB = c

G in
the structure 1 and cG > c

B in the structure 2.
The argument includes two steps. In the step 1, the solution to problem
(TCFOA)(V ) has to be in FOA(V ). In the step 2, the solution to problem
(TFOAC
FOA)(V ) has to be in (V ).
Steps 1-2 imply that TFOA and T have a common xed point. To see this,
note that problems (TCFOA)(V ) and (TFOACFOA)(V ) have a common objec-
tive function. Therefore the step 1 implies (TFOACFOA)(V )  (TCFOA)(V ),
13Functions satisfying assumption 2 and assumption 3 exist for example u(c) = c1 p
where p > 1=2.
14The same set of assumptions are used for both structures in Proposition 3. But
their roles in the structure 1 and in the structure 2 are di¤erent. Indeed, conditions 1-
2, generated by assumptions 2-4, are used di¤erently. As shown in the appendix, both
conditions are used just to rule out a = 0 in the structure 1, while they also generate
concave U(a; c; v) in a under the optimal scheme (c; v) in the structure 2.
9
and the step 2 gives (TFOACFOA)(V )  (TCFOA)(V ). These two inequalities
imply
CFOA(V ) = (TFOAC
FOA)(V ) = (TCFOA)(V ). (3.12)
Hence CFOA(:) is also a xed point of T . Since T and TFOA are contraction
mappings, as shown in appendix, CFOA(:) is the unique xed point of T
and TFOA. Also, the equality (3.12) and steps 1-2 imply common policy
functions for (TCFOA)(V ) and (TFOACFOA)(V ). It is valid to study the
problem (TFOACFOA)(V ).
Appropriate Inada conditions rule out solutions with boundary e¤ort level
in the problem (TCFOA)(V )15. The rst-order condition in the problem
dened in constraint IC is satised. Therefore, we have the step 1.
To show the step 2, we want to make sure that U(a; c; vU) is concave in
a16, if (c; vU) is the scheme solution to the problem (TFOAC
FOA)(V ). The
ordering
u(cG)
1   
u(cB)
1    (u(c

U) + v

U) (3.13)
is a su¢ cient condition for this by formula (2.4). Such ordering will be
generated in the following.
3.1.1 Ordering u(c

G)
1  
u(cB)
1   (u(cU) + vU)
In the structure 1, the e¤ort doesnt a¤ect the conditional probability of
o¤er type. Since the worker is risk averse, the e¢ cient risk sharing implies
the same continuation value of promised utility for both types of employed
workers. Therefore we have cG = c

B
17. The equality constraint IC of FOA
becomes  ma(U; a)[u(c

B)
1    (u(cU) + vU)] = 1, leading to
u(cB)
1   (u(cU) +
vU). Therefore any optimal scheme to the problem (TFOAC
FOA)(V ) satises
u(cG)
1  
u(cB)
1   (u(cU) + vU). U(a; c; vU) is concave in a. The rst order
condition, Ua(a; c; vU) = 0, is a su¢ cient condition for the optimal e¤ort
solution to the problem dened by constraint IC.
The partial justication in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] applies to the
structure 1, because constraint IC of FOA could be reduced into ma(U; a)[u(c

B)
1   
15For more discussions, see appendix subsection 6.4.
16Then Ua(a; c; vU ) = 0 is a su¢ cient and necessary condition for the optimal in
problem maxa2E U(a; c; v).
17Combining (3.5) and (3.6) leads to cG = c

B .
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(u(cU) + v

U)] = 1. This is not the case in the structure 2. A di¤erent argu-
ment is developed.
Call C(:) satises condition 1 if
Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  )) for V 2 V .
Claim 1 If CFOA(:) satises condition 1, the optimal plan in (TFOACFOA)(V )
has the desired ordering (3.13).
With the inequality constraint IC of FOA, Ua(a; c; vU)  0, the multiplier
of the constraint IC of FOA is non-positive,   0. Through comparing the
rst-order conditions (3.5)-(3.7), we can derive u(cG)  u(cB)  u(cU) from
  0 and MLRP. Furthermore, since CFOA(:) satises condition 1 and (3.8)
holds, we have u 10(u(cU)) =
1
u0(cU )
= CFOAv (v

U)  u 10(vU(1 )). Thus the
unemployed workers current utility is always higher than the average future
utility: u(cU)  vU(1  ). The optimal plan has ordering (3.13). Therefore
U(a; c; vU) is concave in a. The su¢ cient and necessary condition for the
optimal private e¤ort a is Ua(a; c; vU) = 0. But, this might not hold in
structure 2 because inequality constraint is used. Claim 2 deals with this
issue. Call C(:) satises condition 2 if
C(V )  
 1(Cv(V ))
1    
wB
(1  ) for V 2 V ;with (c) =
1
u0(c)
.
Claim 2 If CFOA(:) satises condition 2, constraint IC of FOA is binding
for the optimal solution in (TFOACFOA)(V ).
By way of contradiction, suppose that the multiplier for constraint IC
of FOA is 0. Then F.O.C.s (3.5)-(3.7) imply cU = c

B = c

G. The F.O.C.
(3.8) implies 
 1(CFOAv (V ))
1  =
cU
1  . Thus condition 2 on C
FOA(:) becomes
cU + C
FOA(vU)  c

U wB
1  . Then we have the corresponding ordering for the
planner: cU + C
FOA(vU)  c

B wB
1  >
cG wG
1  . Applying formula (2.3) to the
planners cost, we have
C(a; c; vU) = m(G; a)(
cG   cB
1   ) + (3.14)
[m(G; a) +m(B; a)][
cB
1     (cU + C
FOA(vU))]
+(cU + C
FOA(vU)).
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C(a; c; v) is dened as a function of contract (a; c; v). Its value is the asso-
ciated cost. With ma(U ; a) < 0, ma(U ; a) + ma(B; a) < 0 and the order-
ing for the planner, it is not hard to see Ca(a; c; vU) < 0 from (3.14).
The constraint IC of FOA in the structure 2 implies Ua(a; c; vU)  0.
Therefore both parties prefer a higher e¤ort under (c; vU), leading to 0 >
Ca(a
; c; vU) + Ua(a
; c; vU), a contradiction to F.O.C. (3.9).
The last step is to show that mapping TFOA preserves conditions 1-2
under assumptions 2-4. Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 have the technical dis-
cussion. We follow Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] and implicitly assume that
TFOA preserves di¤erentiability.
3.1.2 Some Remarks
The structure 1 seems to be a special case of the structure 2. In fact, the
argument for structure 2 also works for structure 1. We use the argument in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) to the structure 1, because it generates con-
cavity in a simpler way, and also it doesnt require showing binding constraint
IC of FOA.
The literature studying justication of the FOA includes two mainstreams:
Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988). We apply the Rogerson method to the
structure 2 for two reasons. First, Rogerson imposes less conditions on util-
ity function than Jewitt does. Applying the Rogerson method requires less
conditions on the cost function18, an exogenous object in our setup. Sec-
ond, Jewitt assumes the equality constraint IC of FOA, but showing that
the multiplier is negative19 becomes a problem20. Jewitts method doesnt
apply because the value functions are di¤erent across states in our model.
3.2 History dependence
We use FOA to consider two questions in the extended model. First, how
the duration of unemployment a¤ects the net transfers to the worker is con-
18Rogerson and Jewitt considered a static moral hazard problem. Our set-up and the
static model turn out to be very similar. The cost function is corresponding to the workers
utility function.
19A negative multiplier helps to generate the desired ordering and other properties about
the solution plan.
20We dont have this problem for the structure 1. Because a negative multiplier doesnt
help to justify FOA, we can follow Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] and use validity of the FOA
to show that the multiplier is negative.
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sidered. Proposition 4 shows that the optimal contract still exhibits benets
that decrease as unemployment spell lasts longer. Then, we turn to charac-
terizing the wage tax rule. Proposition 5 shows that the optimal contract
has wage tax of history dependence, i.e., (cBt; c

Gt) depends on t
21.
Let C(V ) be the common xed point of mappings TFOA and T . The
results in this section depend on convexity and di¤erentiability22 of C(:),
which is also a problem in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. Finding conditions
that guarantee convexity in this model might not be easy due to the follow-
ing. The graph of FOA is not generally convex. Moreover, its objective
function in the mapping TFOA might not be convex even if C(:) is convex23.
Therefore standard SLP technique doesnt apply. Hopenhayn and Nicolini
[4] suggested but didnt try using lotteries to convexify the objective func-
tion and constraint correspondence24. We follow them and consider a model
without lotteries.
Proposition 4 In both structures, suppose that assumptions 1-4 hold and
that the mapping TFOA preserves di¤erentiability at the interior promised
utility. Then if promised utility at period 0 V0 is in (0; V ), the optimal
consumption is decreasing over the unemployment spell. If additionally
C(V ) is convex, promised continuation value V is decreasing over the
unemployment spell.
Proof. With Proposition 3, we are justied to use FOA. Consider period-
t + 1 problem C(vUt+1) = TFOAC(vUt+1). By Lemma 4.2, t + 1-period
multipler is strictly negative: t+1 < 0.
1
u0(cUt+1)
=  t+1   t+1
ma(U; at+1)
m(U; at+1)
25. (3.15)
21We use cit for c

i (t), where c

i (:) is specied by the contract.
22Milgrom and Segal [7] shows that di¤erentiability can be supported by assumptions
on the optimal contract. But no assumptions on exogenous objects is provided.
23The constraint set and the objective function are of the form xy with choice variables
x and y. Use function f(x; y) = xy as an example. It is not convex or concave, because
its Hessain matrix is

0 1
1 0

.
24They said in all their numerical exercises, cost functions turn out to be convex.
25The consumption is dependent on the whole history up to current period. Notations
here ignore previous history to avoid complication.
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Then t+1 < 0 and
ma(U;a)
m(U;a)
< 0 lead to 1
u0(c
Ut+1)
<  t+1 in (3.14). Combine
this with the envelope condition,  t+1 = Cv (vUt+1), we have 1u0(c
Ut+1)
<
Cv (v

Ut+1). Note also that the F.O.C.(3.8) for period-t
 problem still holds:
1
u0(c
Ut )
= Cv (v

Ut+1). We have
1
u0(c
Ut+1)
< 1
u0(c
Ut )
. Then the concavity of u
implies cUt+1 < c

Ut.
With the F.O.C. (3.8) for period-t and period-t + 1, 1
u0(c
Ut+1)
< 1
u0(c
Ut )
imply Cv (v

Ut+1) < C

v (v

Ut). With convexity of C
(V ) we have vUt+1 <
vUt. By mathematical induction, the above argument applies for all t.
Therefore we have cUt+1 < c

Ut and v

Ut+1 < v

Ut for all t.
Proposition 5 In both structures, suppose that assumptions 1-4 hold and
that the mapping TFOA preserves di¤erentiability at the interior promised
utility. C(V ) is convex, and m(B; a) is increasing in a. Then if
the promised utility V is in (0; V ), then we cant have (cGt; c

Bt) =
(cG; c

B)
26 for all t, where ci is a constant for i 2 fG;Bg. The tax on
wage is not independent of the unemployment history27.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose cBt = c

B and c

Gt = c

G for all t.
Lemma 4.2 shows that period-t multiplier associated with constraint IC of
FOA is strictly negative: t < 0.
By comparing the RHS of the F.O.C.s (3.5)-(3.8), we can derive u(c

G)
1  >
u(cB)
1  > u(c

Ut) + v

Ut from MLRP and t < 0. By proposition 4, u(c

Ut)
and vUt and hence u(c

Ut) + v

Ut are decreasing over unemployment spell.
Therefore we have u(c

G)
1  >
u(cB)
1  > u(c

Ut) + v

Ut > u(c

Ut+1) + v

Ut+1. Also
(at ; c

t ; v

U(t+1)) satises constraint IC of FOA for all t. So a

t is increasing
over unemployment spell.
MLRP implies
ma(G; a)
m(G; a)
>
(ma(G; a) +ma(B; a))
(m(G; a) +m(B; a))
(3.16)
26cit is the future consumption level if worker nd a type-i job in period t, i 2 fG;Bg:
27The proof is an extension of the argument in [4].
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Therefore we have
[
m(G; a)
m(G; a) +m(B; a)
]0
=
ma(G; a)(m(G; a) +m(B; a))  (ma(G; a) +ma(B; a))m(G; a)
(m(G; a) +m(B; a))2
(3.17)
> 0 (3.18)
Let
E(
1
u0(cjk)
jj 2 fG;Bg) = 1
u0(cGk)
m(G; a)
m(G; a) +m(B; a)
+
1
u0(cBk)
m(B; a)
m(G; a) +m(B; a)
With cG > c

B and increasing a

t in t, it is not hard to see that E(
1
u0(cjk)
jj 2
fG;Bg) is increasing over unemployment spell.
If we keep substituting the martingale property into previous period mar-
tingale property, we have
1
u0(cUt 1)
=
TX
k=0
[i=k 2i= 1 m(U; a

t+i)](1 m(U; at+k 1)) (3.19)
E(
1
u0(cj(t+k))
jj 2 fG;Bg) + [i=T 1i= 1 m(U; at+i)]
1
u0(cU(t+T ))
.
with [i= 1i=0 m(U; a

t+i)] = 1. The unemployed worker will eventually get an
o¤er:
PT
k=0[
i=k 1
i=0 m(U; a

t+i)](1 m(U; at+k)) = 1. Let T go to +1 in (3.18).
And since E( 1
u0(cjk)
jj 2 fG;Bg) is increasing on k, we have
1
u0(cUt 1)
> E(
1
u0(cjt)
jj 2 fG;Bg) (3.20)
cG > c

B implies
1
u0(c
U(t 1))
> E( 1
u0(cjt)
jj 2 fG;Bg) > 1
u0(cBt)
.
However, the F.O.C. for cBt
1
u0(cBt)
=  t   t
ma(B; at)
m(B; at)
. (3.21)
ma(B; a) > 0 and the envelope condition 1u0(c
U(t 1))
=  t imply 1u0(cUt 1) <
1
u0(cBt)
, generating a contradiction.
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4 Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion
Our paper introduces two types of observable job o¤ers into the model of
Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4] and allows net transfers to be contingent on the
type of o¤er. To simplify the analysis, we use the rst-order approach. A
set of conditions is proposed to support this approach in this dynamic model
with two absorbing states. However, showing di¤erentiability is missing in
our paper, as well as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4]. When both types of job
o¤ers are always accepted, we illustrate that dependence on o¤er type might
not be redundant. History-dependences of unemployment benets and net
transfers on wage are robust in the extended model. Further extension to a
model with multiple absorbing states is immediate.
The model we have studied contains a number of restrictions. We assume
conditions under which the two types of employment are absorbing states.
It would be interesting to introduce transitional states28. However, if we
do so, it is hard to nd a way to restrict the rst-order derivatives of cost
functions across di¤erent states, leading to new problems with justication
of FOA and characterizing the optimal contract. Also our analysis, as well as
that in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], relies on convexity and di¤erentiability
assumptions. Showing these properties of the cost function in our model
requires di¤erent proof techniques from standard methods. One possible
way, suggested by Hopenhayn and Nicolini [4], is to allow lotteries. This
approach has not yet been explored.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proposition 1
The section allows planner to tell worker to reject o¤er and presents condi-
tions under which She doesnt want rejecting o¤er. Contract is redened.
Specically, compared with previous denition, acceptance rule is added into
the prole. Functions are contingent on o¤er history instead of workers
state history. Then transition matrix and continuation contract with e¤ort
observed are prepared for proposition 1.
Let S denote an acceptance rule: S:O  H ! H; with search-outcome
space O = fg; b; ug and workers state space H = fG;B;Ug. G;B;U stand
for becoming good-job employed, bad-job employed and unemployed. g; b; u
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denote arrival of a good-job o¤er, a bad-job o¤er and no o¤er respectively.
An acceptance rule species acceptance decision over each type of o¤er real-
ization for each type of worker.
An acceptance rule is restrictive by workers state. We denote the space of
feasible acceptance rules: D = fS : OH ! HjS(j; i) 2 fUg[fig[fI(j)gg,
where I(:) : O ! H maps an element, denoted by a small letter j, in O to
the element, denoted by the js capital letter J , in H.
Denote workers o¤er realized at date t jt. The public history up to the
beginning of period t is workers o¤er history: jt 1 = j0; :::jt 1. Let the set
of historyjt 1 be t = fjt 1j8k 2 N; jk 2 Og, with 0 = ;.
The planner recommends e¤ort and acceptance rule to the worker at
the beginning of each period, based on available information: jt 1. Then
search outcome is realized. With this additional information, consumption
level is specied.In particular, A contract (c; a; d) species three sequences
of functions: fctg1t=1, fatg1t=1 and fdtg1t=1 where ct : t+1 ! Z; at : t ! E;
dt : 
t ! D: ct , at and dt are current consumption, current recommended
action and current acceptance rule for period t.
O¤er realization and acceptance rule determine workers state, which in
turn determines wage payment. Therefore we want to keep track of it, al-
though the state is not in the public history. Let it be workers state right
after current acceptance rule is carried out. Dene the transition probability
that o¤er jt is realized and workers state become it, conditional on state
it 1, as function
q(it; jtjit 1; at; dt) = m(jt; at)1(dt(jt; it 1) = it)29. (6.1)
Since o¤er realization is correlated over time through e¤ort strategy,
we can calculate the probability of realized o¤er sequence jt and state se-
quence it up to the beginning of period t+1 recursively: (it; jt; a; d) =
q(it; jtjit; at; dt)(it 1; jt 1; a; d), (U; ;; a; d) = 1; for any fatg and fdtg. The
conditional probability (it; jtjik; jk; a; d) can be obtained similarly.
Consider the node right after a worker with continuation lifetime value V
receives bad-job o¤er wB. We change the environment. Suppose from next
period onward e¤ort is observed. If the worker is told to reject current job
o¤er, the minimal cost of continuation contract in this environment is the
29jt 1 is omitted in q, because the transition matrix doesnt depend on jt 1.
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minimal value of the following problem:
min
(c;a;d)
ck +
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it+1;jt+1
(it+1; jt+1jik; jk; a; d)(c(jt+1)  wit+1)
s.t V  u(ck) +
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it+1;jt+1
(it+1; jt+1jik; jk; a; d)u(c(jt+1))
 
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it;jt
(it; jtjik; jk; a; d)at(jt)
Without further incentive problem, the solution implies full insurance
against o¤er risk. The cost formula therefore can be further simplied. Sup-
pose a; d are recommended e¤ort and recommended acceptance rule in the
solution scheme. The minimal cost to the above problem is
u 1(V (1  ) + (1  )P1t=k t+1 kPit;jt (it; jtjik; jk; a; d)at(jt))
1  
 
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it+1;jt+1
(it+1; jt+1jik; jk; a; d)wit+1 (6.2)
The following proposition allows us to focus on the case where both types
of job are accepted every period. The proof is by comparing the option of
accepting current bad-job o¤er, that of rejecting current o¤er rejected with
e¤ort observed in the future and that of rejecting current o¤er with e¤ort
unobserved in the future.
Proposition 1 With wG  wB  wG, the optimal contract tells worker to
accept bad job o¤er or to stay bad-job employed.
Proof. Suppose that the worker has a bad job at hand and is promised
continuation lifetime value V . If the job is accepted and worker wont quit
this job, the continuation cost isu
 1(V (1 )) wB
1  .
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Consider
u 1(V (1  ) + (1  )P1t=k t+1 kPit;jt (it; jtjik; jk; a; d)at(jt))
1  
 
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it+1;jt+1
(it+1; jt+1jik; jk; a; d)wit+1
 u
 1(V (1  ))
1    
wG
1   (6.3)
 u
 1(V (1  ))  wB
1   (6.4)
The second inequality is from wG > wB  wG. The rst one is by u0 > 0
and the following:
1X
t=k
t+1 k
X
it+1;jt+1
(it+1; jt+1jik; jk; a; d)wit+1
= Eaf
1X
t=1
twig (6.5)
 Eaf
1X
t=1
twGg (6.6)
=
wG
1   (6.7)
If the bad-job o¤er is rejected, the minimal cost of continuation contract
with future e¤ort unobserved is higher than that with future e¤ort observed,
which is higher than accepting current bad-job o¤er by (6.4). Therefore
accepting and staying employed whenever it is possible is optimal.
6.2 Employed Worker Problem
Consider an incentive-compatible continuation contract with continuation
lifetime value VG for a good-job employed worker. With no further incentive
problem for employed worker, it is optimal to give worker a constant level
of consumption cG = u 1(VG(1   )). The optimal period net transfer will
be cG   wG. With cG   wG > 0, the planner subsidizes good-job employed
worker; With cG   wG < 0, the planner taxes good-job employed worker.
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Expected cost function of the optimal contract providing VG to good-job
employed worker is u
 1(VG(1 )) wG
1  , which is strictly increasing and strictly
convex in VG. The derivative with respect to V is 1u0(cG) .
The similar statement holds for a bad-job employed worker. The expected
cost and derivative are u
 1(VB(1 )) wB
1  and
1
u0(cB)
, respectively, with VB =
u(cB)
1  .
6.3 Existence
In this section, we consider the xed point issues of the mapping T and a
mapping redened from TFOA . First we show that the redened mapping
has a continuous correspondence. Then we show that it satises blackwell
su¢ cient conditions, and hence it is a contraction mapping on bounded con-
tinuous function space. Similar results hold for T by a similar discussion.
6.3.1 Continuity
We want to show that FOA(V ) is continuous at V = V .
First, we show that it is upper hemi-continuous at V = V . Suppose se-
quences fvig and f(ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU)g with vi ! V  and (ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU) 2
FOA(vi). SinceEZ3V is compact, there exists a subsequence f(aij ; cijG; cijB; cijU ; vijU )g
and (a0; c0G; c
0
B; c
0
U ; v
0
U) 2 EZ3V ; (aij ; cijG; cijB; cijU ; vijU ) converges to (a0; c0G; c0B; c0U ; v0U).
Continuous U(a; c; v) implies U(aij ; (cijG; c
ij
B; c
ij
U ); v
ij
U )! U(a0; (c0G; c0B; c0U); v0U).
Because (aij ; cijG; c
ij
B; c
ij
U ; v
ij
U ) satises promise-keeping constraint, we have V
 
U(aij ; (c
ij
G; c
ij
B; c
ij
U ); v
ij
U )  vij 30. vij ! V  and U(aij ; (cijG; cijB; cijU ); vijU ) !
U(a0; (c0G; c
0
B; c
0
U); v
0
U) lead to U(a
0; (c0G; c
0
B; c
0
U); v
0
U) = V
. Note that the only
plan in EZ3V with lifetime value V  is (0; wG; wG; wG; V ). This implies
(a0; c0G; c
0
B; c
0
U ; v
0
U) = (0; wG; wG; wG; V
) 2 FOA(V ). FOA(V ) is upper
hemi-continuous at V = V .
Now consider lower hemi-continuity at V = V . We want to show that for
any fvig with vi ! V , there exists a sequence f(ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU)g satisfying
(ai; ciG; c
i
B; c
i
U ; v
i
U) 2 FOA(vi) and (ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU) ! (0; wG; wG; wG; V ).
Actually, for any sequence f(ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU)g with (ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU) 2
FOA(vi), any subsequence of f(ai; ciG; ciB; ciU ; viU)g has a sub-subsequence
30Any incentive-compatible contract in E Z3  V is associated with lifetime value no
higher than V .
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convergent to (0; wG; wG; wG; V ) by the argument for u.h.c. at V = V . This
implies (ai; ciG; c
i
B; c
i
U ; v
i
U) ! (0; wG; wG; wG; V ) 2 FOA(V ). FOA(V ) is
lower-hemi continuous at V .
FOA(V ) is l.h.c. at V 2 [0; V ).
For V = 0, consider any sequence fvjg with vj ! 0. If we have (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) =
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0), we can construct a sequence f(0; cj; cj; 0; 0)g with cj satisfy-
ing u(cj)
1  (1  m(U; 0)) = vj31, which implies cj ! 0, hence (0; cj; cj; 0; 0) !
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0). Moreover with Ua(0; (cj; cj; 0); 0) = +1 > 0, we have (0; cj; cj; 0; 0) 2
FOA(vj); If we have (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2  FOA(0), it satises U(a; c; vU)  0
and Ua(a; c; vU)  0. Because U(a; c; vU) and Ua(a; c; vU) are continuous, we
can construct a sequence convergent to (a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) by similar pertur-
bation. Therefore FOA(V ) is l.h.c. at V = 0.
For V 2 (0; V ), FOA(V ) is dened by two continuous functions. Similar
perturbation can be constructed so that FOA(:) is l.h.c. at V 2 (0; V ). In
summary, FOA(V ) is l.h.c. at V 2 [0; V ]. Therefore its closure FOA(V ) is
l.h.c. at V 2 [0; V ]32.
Then we want to show that FOA(V ) is u.h.c.. FOA(V ) is immedi-
ately u.h.c. at V 33, because FOA(V ) is upper hemi-continuous at V =
V . We need to show that FOA(V ) is u.h.c. at V 2 [0; V ). Dene
	(v) = f(a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 E  Z3  V jv  U(a; c; vU)g and  FOA =
f(a; cG; cB; cU ; vU) 2 E  Z3  V j0  Ua(a; c; vU)g [ f(0; 0; 0; 0; 0)g. With
V 2 [0; V ), it is not hard to see FOA(V ) = 	(V ) \  FOA, which implies
FOA(V ) = 	(V )\ FOA. 	(V ) is dened by V  U(a; c; vU), and U(a; c; vU)
is continuous. So 	(V ) and hence 	(V ) have a closed graph on [0; V 0] with
V < V 0 < V . Also since  FOA is closed, FOA(V ) also has a closed graph
on [0; V 0]. Furthermore, because FOA(V ) is in a compact space EZ3V ,
FOA(V ) is u.h.c. at V 2 [0; V )34.
31This is feasible for su¢ ciently large j.
32See exercise 25 page 300 in Real Analysis with economics application.
33See exercise 13 page 293 in Real Analysis with economics application.
34See proposition 3 (a) about closed graph, page 295 in Real Analysis with economics
application.
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6.3.2 Contraction
Dene bTFOA with constraint set FOA(V ) replaced by FOA(V ) in TFOA35.
The following considers the xed points of the redened mapping bTFOA and
mapping T .
Proposition 2 Consider the mapping bTFOA with constraint set FOA(V )
replaced by FOA(V ) in TFOA. This mapping is a contraction mapping
on a space of bounded continuous functions, hence its unique xed
point is a bounded continuous function; T is a contraction mapping on
a space of bounded functions, hence its unique xed point is a bounded
function.
Proof. Suppose B(V ) is the space of continuous functions on V . Notice
that FOA(:) is continuous, compact and non-empty. The theorem of max-
imization implies bTFOA : B(V ) ! B(V ). For 8 C(V ) 2 B(V ), we want to
show that bTFOA satises blackwell su¢ cient conditions:
Discounting: We have
(bTFOAC)(V ) + k  m(g; a)(cG   wG
1   ) (6.8)
+m(b; a)(
cB   wB
1   )
+m(u; a)fcU   wU + C(vU)g
+m(u; a)k
 bTFOA(C + k)(V ) (6.9)
with k > 0 and (a; c; v)36, the solution to the above problem (bTFOAC)(V ).
35But the solution plan is in FOA(V ) if C(V ) satises two inequality. At V = V ,
the solution is (0; wG; wG; wG; V ) 2 FOA(V ). At V = 0, the solution is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2
FOA(0). In later section, we shows that the solution is an interior solution at V 2 (0; V ),
therefore it is also in FOA(V ).
36This solution to bTFOAC(V ) exists because we have continuous objective function and
compact constraint set.
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Monotonicity: Suppose C1; C2 2 B(V ) with C1  C2. We have
(bTFOAC2)(V ) = m(G; a0)(c0G   wG
1   ) (6.10)
+m(B; a0)(
c0B   wB
1   )
+m(U ; a0)(c0U   wU + C2(v0U))
 m(G; a0)(c
0
G   wG
1   ) (6.11)
+m(B; a0)(
c0B   wB
1   )
+m(U ; a0)(c0U   wU + C1(v0U))
 (bTFOAC1)(V ) (6.12)
with (a0; c0; v0) the optimal plan to the problem (bTFOAC2)(V ).
The mapping of bTFOA is a contraction mapping on B(V ). Its xed point is
a bounded continuous function. T is also a contraction mapping in bounded
function space by a similar argument.
6.4 Interior Solution
6.4.1 Interior e¤ort
We want to have interior e¤ort in TC(V ) and bTFOAC(V ) with V 2 (0; V ).
For TC(V ), if the optimal implementable e¤ort is an interior e¤ort level,
it satises rst-order condition in workers private problem. Therefore the
policy function of problem TC(V ) is in FOA(V ).
For bTFOAC(V ), if the optimal e¤ort is an interior e¤ort level, the pol-
icy function of bTFOAC(V ) is in FOA(V ), the constraint set of bTFOAC(V ),
implying bTFOAC(V ) = TFOAC(V ). Thus the existence results for bTFOAare
carried over to TFOA.
Dene a subspace of continuous functions space
M(V ) = fC(V ) 2 B(V )jC(V )  
 1(Cv(V ))
1    
wB
(1  )
; Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  ));with (c) = 1
u0(c)
; and Cv(0) = 0g.
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Lemma 1 With C(V ) 2 M(V ), we have a 2 (0; a) in solution to prob-
lems TC(V ), bTFOAC(V )37 and TFOAC(V ) for all V 2 (0; V ), in both
structures.
Proof. With ma(i; a) = 0, i 2 fG;B;Ug, we have Ua(a; c; v) < 0 for any
scheme of (c; v). The worker tend to reduce e¤ort level. Thus a = a is
not implementable and hence it is not optimal in problem TC(V ) for any
function C(V ) and V 2 [0; V ]. Similar statement applies to TFOAC(V ).
By way of contradiction, suppose a = 0 in problem TC(V ) for V 2
(0; V ). Consider the problem Q(V )
min
(c;vU )
m(G; 0)(
cG   wG
1   ) +m(B; 0)(
cB   wB
1   ) (6.13)
+m(U ; 0)(cU + C(vU))
s.t. V  U(0; c; vU).
Denote the minimal cost q(V ). It is obvious that q(V )  TC(V ). In problem
Q(V ), the rst-order conditions are
1 + u0(ci )  0, if ci = wG (6.14)
1 + u0(ci )  0, if ci = 0 (6.15)
1 + u0(ci ) = 0, otherwise (6.16)
Cv(v

u) +   0, if vU = V  (6.17)
Cv(v

u) +   0, if vU = 0 (6.18)
Cv(v

u) +  = 0, otherwise (6.19)
for i 2 H.
ci = wG implies u
0(ci ) = 0 violating rst-order condition (6.14). There-
fore we have ci < wG. Similarly we have v

U < V
:
Now suppose ci = 0. The F.O.C. (6.15) implies  = 0. Then the F.O.C.
(6.15) becomes 1  0 for all i 2 H. This implies ci = 0 for all i 2 H. For vU ,
with the F.O.C.s (6.18)-(6.19), we have either Cv(vu) =   = 0 or vu = 0.
Both imply vu = 0, because Cv(V )  u 10(V (1   )) implies Cv(V ) > 0 for
all V 2 (0; V ]. Then the associated lifetime value is equal to 0, violating
the promise-keeping constraint with V > 0.
37 bT is dened in existence section.
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Similarly suppose vu = 0.   0 and F.O.C. (6.18) imply Cv(0) = 0 
   0, hence  = 0. By (6.15), we have ci = 0, violating the above ci > 0.
Hence problem Q(V ) has ci = c
 2 (0; wG) for i 2 H and vU 2 (0; V ).
Now consider the planners cost q(V ). C(V )   1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) implies
C(vu)  c

1    wB(1 ) 38. Therefore we have c
 wG
1  <
c wB
1   c + C(vU).
This implies qa(a; c; vU) < 0 for a 2 [0; a) and qa(0; c; vU) =  139.
1
u0(c) = Cv(v

u), by (6.16) and (6.19), and Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  )) imply
u(c)
1    u(c

U) + v

U . (6.20)
If (6.20) is a strict inequality, we have Ua(0; c; vU) = +1. The optimal e¤ort
solution to workers private problem is a > 0. The incentive-compatible plan
(a; c; vU) generates a higher lifetime value to worker but a strictly lower cost
than q(V ) with qa(a; c; vU) < 0 for a 2 [0; a), generating a contradiction.
If (6.20) is an equality, we have Ua(0; c; vU) =  1. The planner can
increase cG and reduce c

B and c

U by a small amount
40 while maintaining
the same ex-anted promise value to the worker and the same lifetime cost.
Again we have Ua(0; c; vU) = +1. Also this change preserves ordering
cG wG
1  <
cB wB
1   cU + C(vU), hence qa(a; c; vU) < 0 for a 2 [0; a) and
qa(0; c
; vU) =  1. Similar argument for strict inequality (6.20) generates a
contradiction. Therefore we have a > 0.
Similar arguments can be used to rule out e¤ort solution a = 0 tobTFOAC(V ) and that to TFOAC(V ) for V 2 (0; V ).
6.4.2 Interior plan
Now we want to show that the solution to problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior
point in E  Z3  V , for V 2 (0; V ).
Lemma 2 In both structures, suppose C(V ) 2 M(V ). The solution to
problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point inEZ3V , for all V 2 (0; V );
38C(vu)  
 1(Cv(vu))
1    wB(1 ) =
 1( 1
u0(c) )
1    wB(1 ) = c

1    wB(1 )
39q(a; c; vU ) is the cost of plan (a; c; vU ): q(a; c; vU ) = m(G; a) cG wG1  +m(B; a)
cB wB
1  +
m(U; a)(cU + C
FOA(vU ))
40This is feasible because cG is an interior point in Z and

U(a; c; vU ) = U(a
; c; vU )
q(a; c; vU ) = q(a
; c; vU )
is a group of equation with 3 variable.
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If the plan solution to problem TFOAC(0) have e¤ort level a > 0, then
the optimal plan is also an interior point.
Proof. With V 2 (0; V ), Lemma 1 implies that problem TFOAC(V ) has
e¤ort solution a 2 (0; a); Problem TFOAC(0) has e¤ort solution a 2 (0; a).
Hence ma(i;a)
m(i;a)
s are nite nonzero numbers.
When boundary constraints are included in problem TFOAC(V ), the rst-
order conditions for consumption are
1 + u0(ci) + 
ma(i; a)
m(i; a)
u0(ci)  0, if ci = wG (6.21)
1 + u0(ci) + 
ma(i; a)
m(i; a)
u0(ci)  0, if ci = 0 (6.22)
1 + u0(ci) + 
ma(i; a)
m(i; a)
u0(ci) = 0, otherwise (6.23)
for all i 2 H. It is obvious that the rst-order conditions (6.21) imply ci 6= wG
for all i. Similarly Cv(V ) = +1 implies vU 6= V .
First we want to show ci 6= 0 for i 2 fG;Bg in structure 2. The inequality
constraint IC of FOA implies   0. By way of contradiction, suppose cG = 0
for example. (6.22) implies  =  = 041. The F.O.C (6.22) for ci becomes
1 > 0, which implies ci = 0 for all i 2 H. Also the F.O.C.s for vU become
Cv(vU)  0, if vU = V  (6.24)
Cv(vU)  0, if vU = 0 (6.25)
Cv(vU) = 0, otherwise. (6.26)
For Cv(V )  u 10(V (1   )), vU > 0 implies Cv(vU) > 0, violating the
F.O.C.s (6.24) and (6.26). Hence we have vU = 0. v

U = c

i = 0 implies
Ua(a
; c; vU) =  1, contradicting to constraint IC of FOA. Therefore, we
have ci 6= 0 for i 2 fG;Bg.
Then we want to show ci 6= 0 for i 2 fG;Bg in structure 1, where
FOA(V ) are dened by equality constraint IC of FOA. Therefore the multi-
plier  can be positive. By way of contradiction, suppose cG = 0 for example.
 < 0 contradicts to F.O.C.(6.22). Then consider  = 0. This implies  = 0,
41Otherwise, we have  + ma(G;a)m(G;a) < 0, hence ( + 
ma(G;a)
m(G;a) )u
0(cG) =  1, violating
the rst-order condition (6.21) for i = G.
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because  < 0 implies  + ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
< 0, hence ( + ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
)u0(cG) =  1,
violating the rst-order condition (6.22) for i = G. With  =  = 0,
F.O.C. (6.22) becomes 1 > 0. Again, we have ci = 0 for all i 2 H and
vU = 0. Constraint IC of FOA is violated. Consider  > 0. Suppose
( + ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
)  0. ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
= ma(B;a)
m(B;a)
leads to ( + ma(B;a)
m(B;a)
)  0, which
implies 1+u0(ci)+
ma(i;a)
m(i;a)
u0(ci) > 0. Only (6.22) can be satised. Then we
have cB = c

G = 0, violating constraint IC of FOA. Suppose (+
ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
) < 0,
which implies ( + ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
)u0(cG) =  1. The rst-order condition (6.22)
for cG is violated. Given cG = 0. A contradiction is generated for  > 0,
 = 0 and  < 0 respectively. The procedure can be applied to cB = 0.
Hence we have ci 6= 0 for i = fG;Bg for structure 1.
We want to show cU 6= 0. By way of contradiction, suppose cU = 0.
For all i 2 H, we perturb u(ci) around the solution plan by a su¢ ciently
small amount of ui satisfying uB = kuG and uG, uU > 042. The
real number k will be determined properly later. This perturbation generates
changes in expected cost C, workers rst-order derivative Ua, and the lifetime
value U :
C = (m(G; a)
1
u0(cG)
+m(B; a)
k
u0(cB)
)uG +m(U; a
)
uU
u0(0)
(6.27)
Ua = ma(G; a
)uG +ma(B; a)kuG +ma(U; a)uU (6.28)
U = m(G; a)uG +m(B; a)kuG +m(U; a)uU . (6.29)
We want to make sure that the perturbed plan is still in FOA: Ua  0,
U  0. This is equivalent to the following.
uG    ma(U; a
)uU
ma(G; a) +ma(B; a)k
(6.30)
uG    m(U; a
)uU
m(G; a) +m(B; a)k
(6.31)
ci 2 (0; wG) implies 1u0(ci ) > 0 for i 2 fG;Bg. Let k go to  1. We have
(m(G; a) 1
u0(cG)
+ m(B; a) k
u0(cB)
) !  1. (6.26) implies C !  1, with
1
u0(0) = 0. It is easy to check   ma(U;a
)
ma(G;a)+ma(B;a)k ,  
m(U;a)
m(G;a)+m(B;a)k ! 0.
42This can be done without violating boundary constraint, because cG and c

B are interior
points of Z.
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Hence for each a 2 (0; a), there exists a k < 0 such that (6.29), (6.30) and
C < 0 are satised. Thus, we have a perturbation that doesnt violate
any of the constraints but generates strictly lower expected cost, leading to
a contradiction. Because Cv(0)  = 0 plays the same role of 1u0(0) = 0, similar
perturbation implies vU 6= 0. Therefore, we have vU 2 (0; V ).
6.5 Di¤erentiability at boundary
Di¤erentiability If the optimal plan of TFOAC(0) is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0), then we
have (TFOAC)v(0) = 0; We have (TFOAC)v(V ) = +1.
Proof. TFOAC(V ) is di¤erentiable at V = 0. Let V = V1   V0. For
V1 > V0 = 0, we have
0  TFOAC(V1)  TFOAC(V0) (6.32)

X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; 0)
[u 1(u(0) + V (1  ))  u 1(u(0))]
1   (6.33)
+m(U; 0)[u 1(u(0) + V )  u 1(u(0))]
=
X
i2fG;B;Ug
m(i; 0)u 10(V 0i )(V1   V0). (6.34)
(6.32) is by that TFOAC(V ) is non-decreasing on V . Notice that (0; u 1(V (1 
)); u 1(V (1   )); u 1(V ); 0) is a closure point of FOA(V1). It can be
approximated by a sequence of plan in FOA(V1). Also the objective func-
tion is continuous. Hence (6.33) holds. Let V1 go to V0. We have V
0
i ! 0.
Therefore the above inequality implies TFOAC(V1) TFOAC(V0)
V1 V0 ! 0, and thus
(TFOAC)v(0) = 0:
Similar argument implies (TFOAC)v(V ) = +1. The solution to TFOAC(V )
is (0; wG; wG; wG; V ). Also we have (0; u 1(u(wG) V (1 )); u 1(u(wG) 
V (1 )); u 1(u(wG) V ); V ) 2 FOA(V0), for V0 < V1 = V . The same
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logic as the above argument implies the following inequality.
TFOAC(V1)  TFOAC(V0)

X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; 0)
[u 1(u(wG))  u 1(u(wG) V (1  ))]
1   (6.35)
+m(U; 0)[u 1(u(wG))  u 1(u(wG) V )]
=
X
i2fG;B;Ug
m(i; 0)u 10(V 1i )(V1   V0) (6.36)
As V0 ! V , we have V 1i ! u(wG), which implies
P
i2fG;B;Ugm(i; a
0)u 10(V 1i )!
+1, and hence TFOAC(V1) TFOAC(V0)
V1 V0 ! +1.
6.6 About rst-order approach
6.6.1 lemmas
Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 4.1 say that workers value function is concave un-
der solution scheme. Lemma 4.1 says that the multiplier associated with
constraint IC of FOA is negative. Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 imply that
conditions 1-2 are preserved by mapping TFOA.
Lemma 3.1 In structure 1, for V 2 [0; V ), if the optimal plan to problem
TFOAC(V ) is an interior point in E  Z3  V , then it is also in (V ).
It implies cB = c

G.
Proof. Let (a; c; vU) be the solution to TFOAC(V ). Since this is an interior
point, we can use the rst-order conditions
1
u0(cG)
=    ma(G; a
)
m(G; a)
(6.37)
1
u0(cB)
=    ma(B; a
)
m(B; a)
. (6.38)
In structure 1, we have m(G;a
0)
m(G;a)
= m(B;a
0)
m(B;a)
for all a, a0 2 E. This implies
m(G;a0) m(G;a)
m(G;a)a
= m(B;a
0) m(B;a)
m(B;a)a
with a = a0   a. As a ! 0, we have
ma(G;a)
m(G;a) =
ma(B;a)
m(B;a) .
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Therefore (6.37) and (6.38) imply 1
u0(cG)
= 1
u0(cB)
, thus cG = c

B = c
0,
where c0 is some constant. The optimal plan (a; c; vU) satises constraint
IC of FOA
Ua(a
; c; vU) =  ma(U; a)[
u(c0)
1     (u(c

U) + v

U)]  1 = 0. (6.39)
Therefore ma(U; a) < 0 implies the ordering
u(c0)
1  > u(c

U) + v

U . Workers
function U(a; c; vU) is concave in a. Hence Ua(a
; c; vU) = 0 is a neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition for global optimal e¤ort a in workers private
e¤ort problem. The promise-keeping constraint is also satised. Therefore
(a; c; vU) is in (V ).
Lemma 4.1 shows concave workers utility function in private e¤ort level.
Compared with the static moral hazard model, where MLRP is su¢ cient to
validify FOA, we need conditions 1-2 from cost function: C(V ) 2M(V ).
Lemma 4.1 In structure 2, suppose C(V ) 2 M(V ). For V 2 [0; V ), if the
optimal plan to problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point in EZ3V ,
and the MLRP (assumption 1) holds, then the optimal plan is in (V ).
Proof. Since we use inequality constraint IC of FOA, we have   0.
Through the rst-order conditions for ci (3.5)-(3.7), MLRP implies cG  cB 
cU . With F.O.C. (3.8), Cv(V )  u 10(V (1   )) implies u(cG)  u(cB) 
vU(1   ). Therefore we have the ordering u(c

G)
1  
u(cB)
1   u(cU) + vU .
Hence U(a; c; vU) is also concave in a.
Assumptions in Lemma 4.2 are satised, which implies a binding con-
straint IC of FOA: Ua(a; c; vU) = 0. Therefore the optimal e¤ort level a

maximizes U(a; c; vU) given (c
; vU). (a
; c; vU) is in (V ).
Lemma 4.2 In structure 2, suppose C(V )   1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) with (c) =
1
u0(c) . For V 2 [0; V ), if the optimal plan to problem TFOAC(V ) is an
interior point in E  Z3  V , then we have  < 0.
Proof. Denote (a; c; vU) the solution to TFOAC(V ). By way of contra-
diction, suppose  = 0. Then F.O.C.s for consumption (3.5)-(3.7) implies
cG = c

B = c

U = c
 and  < 0.
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With F.O.C. (3.8), 1
u0(c) = Cv(v

U), and C(V )  
 1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) , we
have c + C(vU)  c
 wB
1 
43.
Consider the partial derivative of the planners cost function with respect
to a. We have
ma(G; a
)(
c   wG
1   ) +ma(B; a
)(
c   wB
1   )
+ma(U ; a
)[c + C(vU)]  (6.40)
ma(G; a
)(
c   wG
1   ) ma(G; a
)(
c   wB
1   )
< 0. (6.41)
(6.39) is by ma(U ; a) < 0 and c + C(vU)  c
 wB
1  . Also plan (a
; c; vU)
satises constraint IC of FOA, Ua(a; c; v)  044. Therefore we have
0 > ma(G; a
)(
cG   wG
1   ) +ma(B; a
)(
cB   wB
1   ) (6.42)
+ma(U ; a
)(cU + C(v

U))
+Ua(a
; c; v)
generating a contradiction to F.O.C. for a (3.9).
Lemma 4.3 shows that assumption 3 is crucial for TFOA to preserve in-
equality Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  )).
Lemma 4.3 In structure 2, suppose
1) We have (TFOAC)v(V ) =
P
i2H m(i; a
) 1
u0(ci )
, where (a; c; vU) is the
optimal plan in problem TFOAC(V );
2) The optimal plan to problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point in EZ3V ,
for V 2 (0; V );
3) The solution to (TFOAC)(0) is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0);
43C(vU )  
 1(Cv(vU ))
1    wB(1 ) =
 1( 1
u0(c) )
1    wB(1 ) = c

1    wB(1 ) ! c+C(vU ) 
c wB
1 
44Note that only plan (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) in FOA(0) doesnt satises constraint IC of FOA.
But it is not an interior point in EZ3V . It doesnt satisfy the assumptions in Lemma
4.2.
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4) Assumption 3, Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  )), Cv(0) = 0 hold.
Then we have TFOACv(V )  u 10(V (1  )).
Proof. For V 2 (0; V ), (a; c; vU) is an interior solution. The rst-
order condition (3.8) implies 1
u0(ci )
= u 10(u(cU)) = Cv(v

U). For V = V

the only plan is a boundary point. But we still have 1
u0(wG)
= +1 =
Cv(V
) because of Cv(V )  u 10(V (1   )) = +1. For V = 0, we also
have
P
i2H m(i; 0)
1
u0(0) = Cv(0) = 0 =
1
u0(0) , since the solution to (TFOAC)(0)
is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0).
Consider the martingale property:
(TFOAC)
0(V ) =
X
i2H
m(i; a)
1
u0(ci )
(6.43)
=
X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; a)u 10(u(ci )) (6.44)
+m(U ; a)maxfCv(vU); u 10(u(cU))g

X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; a)u 10(u(ci )) (6.45)
+m(U ; a)maxfu 10(vU(1  )); u 10(u(cU))g

X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; a)u 10(u(ci )) (6.46)
+m(U ; a)u 10(maxfvU(1  ); u(cU)g)g

X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; a)u 10(u(ci )) (6.47)
+m(U ; a)u 10((u(cU) + v

U)(1  ))
 u 10(
X
i2fG;Bg
m(i; a)u(ci ) (6.48)
+m(U ; a)(u(cU) + v

U)(1  ))
 u 10(V (1  )) (6.49)
where (a; cG; c

B; c

U ; v

U) is the solution to problem (TFOAC)(V ). (6.44) is by
1
u0(ci )
= Cv(v

U) = maxfCv(vU); u 10(u(cU))g. Cv(V )  u 10(V (1 )) implies
maxfCv(vU); u 10(u(cU))g  maxfu 10(vU(1 )); u 10(u(cU))g, hence (6.45).
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Increasing u 10 impliesmaxfu 10(vU(1 )); u 10(u(cU))g = u 10(maxfvU(1 
); u(cU)g)g), hence (6.46). (6.47) is by increasing u 10 and the following:
maxfa; bg  a(1  ) + b, with a; b 2 R and  2 (0; 1). (6.50)
(6.48) is by assumption 3: convexity of u 10. (6.49) is by promise-keeping
constraint:
P
i2fG;Bgm(i;a
)u(ci )
(1 ) +m(U ; a
)(u(cU) + v

U)  V .
Lemma 4.4 shows that assumptions 3-4 are crucial for mapping TFOA to
preserve inequality C(V )   1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) .
Lemma 4.4 In structure 2, suppose
1) we have (TFOAC)v(V ) =
P
i2H m(i; a
) 1
u0(ci )
, where (a; c; vU) is the
optimal plan in problem TFOAC(V );
2) The optimal plan to problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point in EZ3V ,
for V 2 (0; V );
3) The solution to (TFOAC)(0) is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0);
4) Assumption 2 and assumption 4 hold;
5) We have C(V )   1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) , Cv(0) = 0 and Cv(V ) = +1.
Then we have (TFOAC)(V )   1((TFOAC)v(V ))1    wB(1 ) .
Proof. We have the following
 1((TFOAC)v(V ))
1    
wB
(1  )
=
 1(
P
i2H m(i; a
)u 10(u(ci )))
1    
wB
(1  ) (6.51)

P
i2H m(i; a
) 1(u 10(u(ci )))
1    
wB
(1  ) (6.52)
=
P
i2H m(i; a
)ci
1    
wB
(1  ) (6.53)

P
i2fG;Bgm(i; a
)[ci   wi]
1   +
m(U ; a)[cU   wB]
(1  ) (6.54)
 TFOAC(V ) (6.55)
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Assumption 2, concavity of 1
u0 , implies that its inverse 
 1 is convex, hence
(6.52). Assumption 4 implies  wB

  wB  m(G; a)(wG   wB), therefore
(6.54). Property C(V )   1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) and Cv(vU) = 1u0(cU ) imply
cU + C(v

U)  c

U wB
1  , hence (6.55).
6.6.2 First-order approach
Proposition 3 In structure 1 (2), suppose that assumptions 1-4 hold and
mapping TFOA preserves di¤erentiability at interior promised values.
Then the FOA is valid. It implies cB = c

G (c

G  cB).
In the following, I will use the previous lemmas to prove Proposition 3.
Step 1 implies that the solution plan to bTFOAC(V ) is in FOA(V ). There-
fore the existence result about bTFOA can be applied to TFOA.
Step 1 With C(V ) 2 M(V ), the solution to bTFOAC(V ) is in FOA(V ) for
V 2 [0; V ].
For V 2 (0; V ), the solution to bTFOAC(V ) has an interior e¤ort by
Lemma 1 and hence it is in FOA(V ).
For V = V , (V ) = FOA(V ) = f(0; wG; wG; wG; V )g implies step 1.
For V = 0, if the optimal e¤ort to problem bTFOAC(0) is 0, then the op-
timal plan is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2 FOA(0), because any plan with a = 0 generates
higher cost than (0; 0; 0; 0; 0); If the optimal e¤ort is strictly positive, since
FOA(0)nFOA(0) only contains plans with e¤ort level 0, the optimal plan is
also in FOA(0).
Step 2 says that the rst-order condition, Ua(a; c; vU) = 0, is a necessary
condition for the optimal contract.
Step 2 With C(V ) 2 M(V ), the solution to (TC)(V ) is in FOA(V ) for
V 2 [0; V ].
For V = V , FOA(V ) = (V ) = f(0; wG; wG; wG; V )g implies step 2.
For V 2 (0; V ), Lemma 1 says the e¤ort solution to (TC)(V ) is an
interior point, hence the optimal plan satises the rst-order condition in
workers private problem, and it is in FOA(V ).
For V = 0, if the optimal plan is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0), then it is also in FOA(0).
If the optimal plan is not (0; 0; 0; 0; 0), it must achieve value V 0 > 045. This
45(0; 0; 0; 0; 0) is the only incentive-compatible plan with promise value value 0.
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plan is also the solution to problem (TC)(V 0), because of (V 0)  (0). We
have a problem with V 0 2 (0; V ) again. The plan is in FOA(V 0). Therefore
it is also in FOA(0) because of FOA(V 0)  FOA(0).
Step 3 makes sure that the solution to problem TFOAC(V ) is still in (V ).
Step 3 In structures 1-2, the solution to TFOAC(V ) is in (V ) for V 2
[0; V ] with C(V ) 2M(V ) and MLRP.
For V = V , the solution to TFOAC(V ) is in (V ) because of (V ) =
FOA(V
) = f(0; wG; wG; wG; V )g.
For V 2 (0; V ), the rst part of Lemma 2 says that the solution to
problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point of EZ3V . Therefore assumptions
in Lemma 3.1 (4.1) are satised. The solution to TFOAC(V ) is in (V ) for
V 2 (0; V ).
For V = 0, if the optimal e¤ort is a = 0, then the optimal plan is
(0; 0; 0; 0; 0) 2 FOA(0)46; if we have a > 0, by the second part of Lemma
2, the optimal plan is an interior point. All assumptions in Lemma 3.1 (4.1)
hold again. Thus the solution to TFOAC(0) is in (0).
Step 4 In structures 1-2, the solution to TFOAC(0) is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) with
C(V ) 2M(V ) and MLRP.
By way of contradiction, suppose (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) is not the solution to TFOAC(0).
Because any other incentive-compatible plan with a = 0 produces strictly
higher cost than (0; 0; 0; 0; 0), the solution (a; c; vU) to problem TFOAC(0)
must have a > 0.Thus the assumptions in second part of Lemma 2 are sat-
ised. So plan (a; c; vU) is an interior point of E  Z3  V and hence it is
in (0) by Lemma 3.1 (4.1).
The solution to (TC)(0) is in FOA(0) by step 1. And TFOAC(0) and
TC(0) have a common objective function. So (a; c; vU) 2 (0) generates
no higher cost than TC(0). (a; c; vU) is also the solution to TC(0).
Under the interior scheme (c; vU), she can guarantee a strictly positive
lifetime value by choosing a = 0 under scheme (c; vU). Because the plan
(a; c; vU) is incentive-compatible, it must generate promised value V
0 > 0.
Because the plan is an interior point, we haveminfu(ci ); (u(cU)+vU)g >
0. Then we can reduce the same su¢ ciently small amount of utility for each
state in the solution plan without violating boundary constraint. Such plan
46Any plan with a = 0 generates higher cost than (0; 0; 0; 0; 0).
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also satises Ua(a; c; vU)  0 and Ua(a; c; vU)  0. But it generate lower cost,
contradicting to the fact that (a; c; vU) is the solution to (TC)(0). Hence
the optimal plan (a; c; vU) should be (0; 0; 0; 0; 0).
Step 5 TFOA :M(V )!M(V ) under assumptions 1-4.
Consider the problem TFOAC(V ) with C(V ) 2 M(V ). First, by Lemma
2, the solution to problem TFOAC(V ) is an interior point in E  Z3  V for
V 2 (0; V ).
Second, step 4 implies that the solution to TFOAC(0) is (0; 0; 0; 0; 0).
Third, we want to have (TFOAC)v(V ) =
P
i2H m(i; a
) 1
u0(ci )
. By the
Lemma in di¤erentiability section, we have (TFOAC)v(V ) =
P
i2H m(i; a
) 1
u0(ci )
for V 2 f0; V g; Assuming that (TFOAC)() is di¤erentiable, we also have
(TFOAC)v(V ) =
P
i2H m(i; a
) 1
u0(ci )
for V 2 (0; V ) by theory 1 in Milgrom
and Segal [7].
Fourth, we have Cv(0) = 0 and Cv(V ) = +1, because C(V ) 2 M(V )
implies Cv(0) = 0 and Cv(V )  u 10(V (1  )).
With the above four conditions and assumptions 2-4, assumptions in
Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 are satised, which implies (TFOAC)(V )   1((TFOAC)v(V ))1   
wB
(1 ) and (TFOAC)(V )  u 10(V (1 )). Moveover, the third condition im-
plies (TFOAC)v(0) = 0. Hence, we have TFOA :M(V )!M(V ).
With C(V ) 2 M(V ), the solution to (TC)(V ) is in FOA(V ), and the
solution to TFOAC(V ) is in (V ), for V 2 [0; V ]. Since TFOAC(V ) and
(TC)(V ) have the same objective function, they have the same policy func-
tion.
The following shows dependency on information structure.
Lemma 5 In structure 2, the solution to problem TFOAC(V ) has cGt > c

Bt
for V 2 (0; V ), with C(V ) 2M(V ) and assumption 1 (MLRP),
Proof. WithC(V ) 2M(V ), Lemma 2 says the solution to problem TFOAC(V )
is an interior point of EZ3V for V 2 (0; V ). It is valid to use the rst-
order conditions (3.5)-(3.6), which imply 1
u0(cGt)
  1
u0(cBt)
= (ma(B;a)
m(B;a)
 ma(G;a)
m(G;a)
).
Since we have an interior optimal plan for V 2 (0; V ), and C(V ) 
 1(Cv(V ))
1    wB(1 ) , the assumptions in lemma 4.2 are satised. Therefore we
have  < 0, which leads to 1
u0(cGt)
  1
u0(cBt)
> 0 in structure 2. Since u is a
strictly concave function, 1
u0(cGt)
  1
u0(cBt)
> 0 implies cBt < cGt.
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